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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case.

This case involves the unfortunate, slip-and-fall injury of Plaintiff/Appellant, Victor
Dupuis ("Victor"), on ice in the parking lot of Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center ("EIRMC")
after a visit to see his hospitalized wife on January 24, 2017. Because of the significant injuries
suffered as a result of the slip and fall, Victor initiated a lawsuit against EIRMC. Victor was an
invitee at the time of his slip and fall, and as such, EIRMC owed the highest duty to Victor under
Idaho's premises liability law. EIRMC also owed Victor a duty of care under common law of
negligence for the voluntary assumption of a duty of care. EIRMC challenged Victor's status as
an invitee during the summary judgment proceedings. The District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of EIRMC, and Appellant believes that such disposition of the instant action
amounted to reversible error for the reasons set forth herein. This appeal resulted.

B. Course of Proceedings.

Victor filed his Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on November 15, 2018 against
Defendants Eastern Idaho Health Services Inc., an Idaho Corporation doing business as Eastern
Idaho Regional Medical Center, and John/Jane Does I-V. (R. Vol. I, pp. 8-12). Defendant Eastern
Idaho Health Services, Inc. dba Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center filed its Answer to
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on December 20, 2018. (R. Vol. I, pp. 13-20).
1. EIRMC's Motion for Summary Judgment.

On January 15, 2020, EIRMC filed its Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Vol., I, pp. 3335), Memorandum in Support (R. Vol. I, pp. 36-52), and supporting Declarations (R. Vol. I, pp.
53-175). In its Motion for Summary Judgment, EIRMC argues:
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1. Victor was a licensee, thus EIRMC owed no duty to inspect or make the premises safe
(R. Vol. I, p. 43);
2. If Victor was an invitee, no duties ofEIRMC were triggered (R. Vol. I, p. 47); and
3. If Victor was an invitee and EIRMC' s duties were triggered, there is no genuine dispute
that EIRMC did not breach its duty of care to Victor (R. Vol. I, p. 49).
Victor's Opposition to EIRMC's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on January 31,
2020 (R. Vol. I, p. 197), along with the Declaration of Shannon McCarthy in Opposition to
EIRMC's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Vol. II, pp. 211-278). Victor opposed EIRMC's
Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that:
1. EIRMC was liable to Victor under common law negligence (R. Vol. I, p. 203);
2. EIRMC was liable to Victor, and all third persons, because it assumed a legal duty of
care by entering into a contract for snow removal with B&K Professional Services (R.
Vol. I, p. 204 );
3. EIRMC was liable under premises liability (R. Vol. I, p. 205) to Victor as an invitee
because as a hospital visitor, Victor should be classified as an invitee (R. Vol. I, p. 206);
and,
4. EIRMC was liable under premises liability to Victor as a licensee (R. Vol. I, p. 208).
Exhibit H to the Declaration of Shannon McCarthy in Opposition to EIRMC's Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. Vol. II, pp. 265-267) contains a report of Roland "Bud" York addressing
the snow removal contract between EIRMC and B&K Professional Services (R. Vol. II, pp. 250264), and EIRMC's negligence with regard to its de-icing procedures (collectively, "Expert
Report").
Victor's Initial Expert Witness Disclosure was also filed on January 31, 2020. (R. Vol. I,
p. 181). Mr. York was listed as a retained expert witness and a copy of Mr. York's Expert Report
was attached thereto as Exhibit A. (R. Vol. I, pp. 187-189). Victor filed his First Supplemental
Disclosure of Expert Witnesses on February 3, 2020, expounding upon Mr. York's opinions
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contained in his Expert Report. (R. Vol. II, p. 279). EIRMC filed its Reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on February 7, 2020. (R. Vol. II, p. 300).

2. EIRMC's Motion to Strike.
On February 7, 2020, EIRMC also filed its Motion to Strike Opinions of Roland York (R.
Vol. II, p. 316), Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike (R. Vol. II, p. 319), Declaration of
Counsel in Support ofMotion to Strike (R. Vol. II, p. 334), and Declaration of Cheri Vandermeulen
in Support of Motion to Strike (R. Vol. II, p. 342). EIRMC moved to strike Mr. York's opinions
on the basis that:
1. Victor's Supplemental Expert Disclosure was untimely (R. Vol. II, p. 323);
2. Mr. York's report was not in admissible form and should be excluded from
consideration for the summary judgment proceedings (R. Vol. II, p. 324); and,
3. Mr. York should be excluded as an expert because his opinions are not helpful to the
trier of fact (R. Vol. II, p. 325).
Victor's Opposition to EIRMC's Motion to Strike (R. Vol. IV, p. 397) and Declaration of
Roland "Bud" York (R. Vol. IV, p. 405) were filed on February 12, 2020.

3. The Hearing and Decision on EIRMC's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion
to Strike.
The District Court heard oral argument on EIRMC's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Motion to Strike Opinions of Roland York on February 14, 2020. (Tr., p. 3). The District Court
heard argument on EIRMC's Motion to Strike first. (Tr., p. 6, L. 16). When oral argument on the
Motion to Strike was complete, the District Court informed the parties that its decision on the
Motion to Strike would be made in conjunction with its decision on the Motion for Summary
Judgment, which it planned to take under advisement (Tr., p. 13, L. 13-25 through Tr., p. 14, L. 12). The District Court then heard argument on EIRMC's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Tr., p.
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14, L. 3). When oral argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment was complete, the District
Court reiterated that it would take the matter under advisement. (Tr., p. 25, L. 17-18).
The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order ("Order") on February 26,
2020 (R. Vol. V, p. 415) granting EIRMC's Motion for Summary Judgment. In ruling on Victor's
status as either an invitee or licensee, the District Court did not have Idaho case law or precedent
to rely upon as this is an issue of first impression for Idaho. (See R. Vol. V, p. 417, "the specific
issue of whether a person visiting someone at a hospital is an invitee or licensee is a matter of first
impression for Idaho courts.") The District Court, in its Order, determined that Victor was not an
invitee, stating in part that:
Dupuis was on the premises not for the purpose of conferring a benefit on
EIRMC, but because EIRMC permitted him to enter the premises to visit a
patient. In contrast to an invitee, there was no general invitation to Dupuis to
enter the premises .... His permission to be on the premises was qualified and
limited to visiting a patient. It is the Court's opinion that the facts of this matter
create a licensee status akin to a social guest.
(R. Vol. V, p. 419).
The District Court determined Victor was a licensee, and, in its analysis of the duty EIRMC
owed to Victor, the District Court stated, "[B]ased on the duty owed to a licensee, Dupuis could
only recover in this action if the dangerous condition in the parking lot was unknown to Dupuis,
and EIRMC had a greater or superior knowledge of the dangerous condition." (R. Vol. V, p. 420).
The District Court then ruled that, "EIRMC' s knowledge of the dangerous condition was not
superior to that of Dupuis and therefore, there was no breach of duty." (R. Vol. V, p. 420).
With its ruling that EIRMC did not breach any duty owed to Victor as a licensee, the
District Court determined that EIRMC's Motion to Strike was moot (R. Vol. V, p. 421),
accordingly, the Order does not provide an analysis or decision regarding EIRMC's Motion to
Strike. The District Court issued its Judgment on February 26, 2020 (R. Vol. V, p. 423) dismissing
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Victor's Complaint. Victor timely filed his Notice of Appeal on March 26, 2020. (R. Vol. V, p.
433).
EIRMC filed its Memorandum of Costs on March 11, 2020 (R. Vol. V, p. 425), to which
Victor filed an Opposition on March 25, 2020 (R. Vol. V, p. 430). In EIRMC's Response to
Plaintiffs Opposition to Memorandum of Costs, filed March 26, 2020 (R. Vol. V, p. 437), EIRMC
stated that it," ... [D]oes not request oral argument on this matter and requests that the Court decide
this issue on the briefing." (R. Vol. V, p. 437). As of the date of filing Appellant's Opening Brief
herewith, the District Court has not issued a decision as to EIRMC's Memorandum of Costs.
Victor objects to any award of costs to EIRMC in this action other than those to which no objection
was filed in the trial court proceedings.

C. Concise Statement of Facts.

Victor married Carol Dupuis on March 2, 1995 in South Jordan, Utah, and they had two
children together, Gordon Dupuis and Noelle Dupuis. (R. Vol. I, p. 198). Victor and Carol moved
to Idaho Falls in 2001 and have continuously lived in Idaho Falls since that date. (R. Vol. I, p.
198). Victor was visiting his wife, Carol, who was hospitalized inpatient at EIRMC at the time of
Victor's slip-and-fall accident, which forms the basis of this litigation.
1. Carol's Chest Pain and Hospitalization.

On the evening of January 23, 2017, Carol began feeling chest pain and general discomfort,
but because of the large amounts of snow coming down, Carol did not want to risk driving to the
hospital and so she decided to wait until the morning to go to the hospital if the pain persisted. (R.
Vol. I, p. 198). Carol did not tell Victor, Gordon, or Noelle (who were all at home with Carol the
evening of January 23, 2017), about the chest pain so as to not cause any worry. (R. Vol. I, p. 198).
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Carol awoke the mornmg of January 24, 2017 still having chest pain and general
discomfort. (R. Vol. I, p. 198). She waited until the morning commute traffic had died down and
until the snowplow had made its way through the streets to tell Victor that she needed to go to the
hospital. (R. Vol. I, p. 198). Upon telling Victor that she needed to go to the hospital, Victor drove
Carol to EIRMC around 9:00 a.m. (R. Vol. I, p. 198).
Upon arrival at EIRMC, Victor parked in a spot near the Emergency Room and walked
Carol into the emergency room, holding her arm. (R. Vol. II, p. 223 (p. 35: L. 16-24)). Victor
stayed with Carol in the emergency room while she underwent testing, had lab work done in the
radiology department, and had a catheter inserted (R. Vol. II, p. 223 (p. 37: L. 19-25)). After Noelle
arrived to be with Carol, Victor went home with plans to come back to EIRMC with Gordon later
in the day. (R. Vol. I, p. 199).
Gordon drove Victor to EIRMC to visit Carol around 6:00 pm the evening of January 24,
2017. (R. Vol. I, p. 199). Upon Victor and Gordon's arrival at EIRMC, Gordon parked the vehicle
on the easternmost side of the parking lot closest to the road and near the main entrance. (R. Vol.
I, p. 199). When Victor and Gordon arrived at EIRMC the evening of January 24, 2017, the
temperature was probably in the 40's, high 30's, low 40's. (R. Vol. II, p. 229 (p. 26: L. 2-5)).
Upon exiting the vehicle, Gordon and Victor walked slowly to the main entrance of the
hospital because the parking lot was very slick. (R. Vol. I, p. 199). After making it safely to the
main entrance ofEIRMC, Victor and Gordon went to Carol's hospital room and visited with Carol
and Noelle for about an hour and a half. (R. Vol. I, p. 199). During Victor and Gordon's visit, there
were nurses and doctors coming and going from the room and the conversation during the visit
related to how Carol was feeling, what had happened, and what was going to happen. (R. Vol. II,
p. 229 (p. 28: L. 4-8)). Gordon and Victor decided to go home for the evening to get some dinner
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and rest before coming back to the hospital the following day. (R. Vol. I, p. 199). Noelle stayed
the night with Carol at the hospital. (R. Vol. I, p. 199).
2. Victor's Slip and Fall Iniury at EIRMC.
Around 8:30 p.m., Victor and Gordon left Carol's hospital room and began walking back
to the vehicle to head home. (R. Vol. I, p. 199). Since the time of Gordon and Victor's arrival at
EIRMC, it had gotten dark and much colder, at least in the low 30's. (R. Vol. I, p. 199). Gordon
and Victor were using the same path they walked on to get to the Main Entrance of EIRMC earlier
that evening, and Gordon was walking about ten feet in front of Victor. (R. Vol. I, p. 199). When
Gordon and Victor were about 50-60 feet from the vehicle, Gordon turned to check on Victor when
he saw Victor's left foot slide out and Victor instantly fell to the ground. (R. Vol. I, p. 199). Gordon
ran back to check on Victor who appeared to be in a lot of pain and at the same time, some visitors
outside of the hospital came over to see if Victor was okay. One of the visitors called EIRMC and
informed the receptionist that someone had slipped and fallen on the ice. (R. Vol. I, p. 200). Shortly
thereafter, three nurses arrived to help Victor and the Security Officer, Spencer Steele, arrived with
them. (R. Vol. I, p. 200). Another nurse brought out a wheelchair for Victor, and it took three
nurses and Gordon to maneuver Victor into the wheelchair. (R. Vol. I, p. 200). Once Victor was
in the wheelchair, he was taken into the ER where he was treated for a broken hip. (R. Vol. I, p.
200). Victor subsequently conducted sepsis while being treated for his broken him, which required
him to endure months of treatment and care. (R. Vol. I, p. 204).
3. EIRMC's Snow Removal Agreement.
In or around March 2013, Grant Gohr, the operations director for EIRMC, was looking for
some cost savings and so he asked B&K Professional Services ("B&K") to provide a budget
summary for the Landscape Maintenance and Snow Removal Agreement ("Agreement") that
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EIRMC and B&K had been parties to since 2008. (R. Vol. I, p. 200). Brent Martin, owner ofB&K,
provided a budget summary dated March 26, 2013 to EIRMC, per Mr. Gohr' s request. (R. Vol. II,
p. 263). Mr. Martin's budget summary recommended the best place for budget savings would be
a reduction in the ice melt applications to the sidewalks and parking areas. (R. Vol. II, p. 263).
Specifically, Mr. Martin recommended a 50% reduction in the amount of ice melt used on the
sidewalks and a 20% reduction in the amount of ice melt used in the parking lots. (R. Vol. II, p.
263). Mr. Martin also recommended cutting the rate back on the ice melt spreader and "not
spreading ice melt in storms where expected continuous snow would require plowing." (R. Vol.
II, p. 263).
Mr. Gohr, on behalf of EIRMC, agreed to reduce the amounts of ice melt used, which
included eliminating the use of parking lot pretreatment with ice melt, which helps get the snow
and ice off the parking lots before it sticks. (R. Vol. I, p. 200). A revised Agreement was entered
into between EIRMC and B&K on October 30, 2013 reflecting these changes. (R. Vol. II, pp. 251263).
4. Responsibilities of EIRMC and B&K Under the Agreement.

Per the Agreement, B&K was to provide snow removal services and ice melt application
to EIRMC. (R. Vol. I, p. 200). According to Mr. Martin, because B&K is not at EIRMC 24/7,
EIRMC has the responsibility to check the EIRMC premises at the times B&K is not there and
notify B&K of any additional needs. (R. Vol. I, p. 200). As testified to by Mr. Martin regarding
EIRMC's responsibility to check the EIRMC property, "if something isn't right or if they see it
and know of a slick spot, they would notify me" (R. Vol. I, p. 200). After applying ice melt to the
EIRMC property in accordance with the Agreement, Mr. Martin does not wait for the ice melt to
react, he applies it and leaves. (R. Vol. I, p. 200). This is because Mr. Martin is under no
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responsibility to monitor the surfaces once ice melt has been applied, instead, he is under the
assumption that EIRMC monitors the surfaces. (R. Vol. I, p. 200). EIRMC is aware of this
protocol, as it has tasked the Facility Safety Officer of EIRMC with making sure snow and ice
removal is done in accordance with EIRMC's expectations. (R. Vol. I, p. 201). Further evidence
that EIRMC is aware of this protocol is that EIRMC has, on prior occasions, notified Mr. Martin
of icy conditions in the parking lot so that B&K could come back to EIRMC. (R. Vol. I, p. 200).
5. Weather Conditions and Parking Lot Conditions on January 24, 2017.

Between January 23, 2017 and January 24, 2017, Idaho Falls suffered inclement weather
and storms, resulting in approximately 9.5 inches of snowfall between the two days. (R. Vol. V,
p. 415). The snow stopped around noon on January 24, 2017 (R. Vol. I, p. 200).
B&K keeps work logs for each day of work, and per the work logs on January 24, 2017,
B&K provided around 17 hours of work to EIRMC (R. Vol. I, p. 201 ). The work provided by B&K
included: "broomed, shoveled, icemelted sidewalks, continuous plowing, and icemelted parking
areas." (R. Vol. I, p. 201). B&K continued to plow the snow and clear the sidewalks until 5:00
pm on January 24, 2017. (R. Vol. I, p. 201). Mr. Martin stayed at EIRMC finishing up the work
until 6:00 or 6:30 pm. (R. Vol. I, p. 202).
Brett Hanson, the Director of Plant Operations at EIRMC, testified that someone from plant
operations at EIRMC should have gone out and checked the conditions of the parking lot the
evening of January 24, 2017. (R. Vol. I, p. 200). However, neither a facility safety officer nor
someone from plant operations checked the conditions of the parking lot the evening of January
24, 2017. (R. Vol. I, p. 200). This is corroborated by Mr. Martin's testimony that after he left
EIRMC for the evening on January 24, 2017, he did not receive a call to come back to EIRMC.
(R. Vol. I, p. 200). As such, when Victor was walking back to the car with Gordon, the parking lot

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF, Page 9

where he slipped and fell did not have any ice melt on it. (R. Vol. I, p. 202). The spot Victor fell
consisted of black ice and there were no visible ice melt granules. (R. Vol. I, p. 202).
With the snow stopping around 1530 hours on January 24, 2017, B&K did what they were
required to do under the Agreement, and EIRMC should have continually checked for ice
throughout the evening. (R. Vol. I, p. 201). Because of the budget cuts, EIRMC parking lots were
not being de-iced and this, in conjunction with EIRMC's failure to check the premises for ice after
B&K left, caused Victor to slip and fall on the black ice. (R. Vol. I, p. 201 ).
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. Did the District Court Err in Determining that Victor was a Licensee Rather Than an
Invitee?
2. Did the District Court Err in Granting EIRMC' s Motion for Summary Judgment?
3. Did the District Court Err in Determining EIRMC Did Not Assume a Duty of Care?
4. Did the District Court Err in Determining that, if Victor was a Licensee, EIRMC did
not Breach its Duty of Care owed to Victor as a Licensee?

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, appellate courts review the
decision de novo but apply the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion.
The David and Marvel Benton Trust v. McCarty, 161 Idaho 145, 384 P.3d 392, (2016); McColm-Traska v. Valley View Inc., 138 Idaho 497, 65 P.3d 519 (2003); Carnell v. Barker Management,
Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 48 P.3d 651 (2002); Kirk v. Wescott, 160 Idaho 893, 382 P.3d 342, (2016);
Idaho Dev., LLC v. Teton View Golf Estates, LLC, 152 Idaho 401,404,272 P.3d 373, 376 (2011);
Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437, 441, 235 P.3d 387, 391 (2010).

A grant of summary judgment is warranted where the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P.
56(c). When making its determination, the Court construes all facts in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. The David and Marvel Benton Trust, 161 Idaho at 150, 384 P.3d at 397;
Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 662, 115 P.3d 751, 753

(2005).
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IV.

ARGUMENT

1. The District Court Erred in Determining Victor was a Licensee Rather than an Invitee.

A. Victor was an Invitee.
The determination of an individual's status as an invitee or a licensee was very recently
decided by this Court. In Packer v. Riverbend Communications, this Court reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant because "(1) it erred in determining that
Packer was not an invitee; and (2) a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Riverbend
breached the duty it owed Packer." Packer v. Riverbend Communs., 2020 Ida. LEXIS 167, *22.
Per this Court's decision in Packer, "An invitee is one who enters upon the premises of
another for a purpose connected with the business conducted on the land, or where it can
reasonably be said that the visit may confer a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible
benefit to the landowner." Packer v. Riverbend Communs ., 2020 Ida. LEXIS 167, * 14 (citing Ball
v. City of Blaclifoot, 152 Idaho 673, 677, 273 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2012). Additionally, this Court

ruled:
The district court below did not identify that there are two separate ways to establish
that a visitor is an invitee. Ball, 152 Idaho at 677, 273 P.3d at 1270 (italics added)
("An invitee is one who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose
connected with the business conducted on the land, or where it can reasonably be
said that the visit may confer a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible
benefit to the landowner."). Instead, the district court focused on language from
Wilson where we concluded that a social guest-a classic licensee-was not elevated
to the status of an invitee by rendering some "minor, incidental service" to the host.
Wilson, 81 Idaho at 545, 347 P.2d at 347.
Packer v. Riverbend Communs., 2020 Ida. LEXIS 167, *15-16 (emphasis added).

The District Court in the case at bar similarly did not identify nor address that there are two
separate ways to establish that a visitor is an invitee. The District Court relied on the second portion
of the above cited definition of an invitee, finding that "Dupuis was on the premises not for the
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purpose of conferring a benefit on EIRMC, but because EIRMC permitted him to enter the
premises to visit a patient." (R. Vol. V, p. 419). The District Court failed to address the first portion
of the definition of an invitee, 'one who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose
connected with the business'. The business ofEIRMC was to ensure Carol Dupuis was taken care
of until she was released; Victor's purpose for visiting Carol was the same - to make sure Carol
was taken care of until she was released. Victor not only drove Carol to EIRMC the morning of
January 24, 2017, but he assisted her into the emergency room by holding her arm (R. Vol. II, p.
223 (p. 35: L. 16-24)), and stayed with her in the emergency room while she underwent testing,
had lab work done in the radiology department, and had a catheter inserted (R. Vol. II, p. 223 (p.
37: L. 19-25)). Victor not only transported Carol to EIRMC, he stayed with her throughout the
day. Additionally, Gordon testified that nurses and doctors came into the room while he and Victor
were in Carol's hospital room, and the conversation was "Me and my dad asking my mom, like,
how she was feeling, what happened, what was going to happen, my sister throwing in details as
- as she did." (R. Vol. II, p. 229 (p. 28: L. 4-8)).
Thus, the purpose of Victor's visit was in fact connected to the business of EIRMC. The
District Court erred in failing to identify and address the two separate ways a visitor can be
established as an invitee.
Also analogous to the case at bar, is this Court's ruling that,
The district court erred as a matter oflaw by analyzing only Riverbend's knowledge
(actual or constructive), and not the affirmative duty owed by an occupier
(Riverbend) to an invitee (Packer) to "keep the premises in a reasonably safe
condition." Holzheimer, 125 Idaho at 400,871 P.2d at 817; see also IDJI 3.11 ("The
[owner/occupier] owes a duty to exercise ordinary care in inspection of the
premises for the purpose of discovering dangerous conditions."). Further, according
to the record on appeal, a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether
Riverbend kept the premises in a reasonably safe condition when there was no
proper lighting on the loading dock.
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Packer v. Riverbend Communs., 2020 Ida. LEXIS 167, *18-19.
As with the district court in Packer, the District Court failed to address the affirmative duty
ofEIRMC to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition. And just like in Packer, a genuine
issue of material fact exists as to whether EIRMC kept the premises in a reasonably safe condition
when no ice melt granules were placed on the black ice where Victor slipped. Based on the
forgoing, the District Court erred in determining Victor was a licensee and not an invitee.

B. Hospital Visitors Should Be Classified as Invitees.
The determination of Victor's status as a visitor at EIRMC is an issue of first impression
for this Court. This Court has, however, ruled on cases wherein a visitor to a hospital was treated
as an invitee; the status of that visitor was not in question at any point in the underlying litigation
or this Court's review and decision. Two of these cases are as follows:
1. In Robertson v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 117 Idaho 979, 793
P .2d 211 (1990), plaintiff Deborah Robertson slipped and fell in the snow
covered parking lot of Magic Valley Regional Medical Center in November
1985. She was considered an invitee throughout the entirety of the litigation and
her status as an invitee was not an issue on appeal.
2.

Similarly, in Bates v. Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center, 114 Idaho 252,
755 P.2d 1290 (1988), the plaintiff, Ms. Bates, had visited a patient at Eastern
Idaho Regional Medical Center twice before, and on her third visit, she parked
in the emergency room parking lot, walked across the parking lot to the
pedestrian walkway, and then into the emergency entrance into the hospital.
The parking lot and pedestrian walkway were covered with ice. Once the visit
was over, Ms. Bates exited the hospital and retraced her previous route along
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the walkway to the parking lot, where she slipped and fell. Ms. Bates was
considered an invitee without question by the district court, though her status
as an invitee was not an issue on appeal.
Although this specific issue as to the status of an individual visiting a loved one at the
hospital has not been directly decided by this Court, prior plaintiffs in the same position as Victor,
have been considered invitees, thus, Victor should be classified as an invitee. That conclusion
seems axiomatic from the dicta in Bates.
As stated in the District Court's Order, as well as the briefing on summary judgment,
jurisdictions are split as to whether or not a visitor at a hospital is considered an invitee or a
licensee. Several jurisdictions have abolished the tripartite system of landowner duties based upon
status as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Of course, Idaho still follows the tripartite system of
liability in premises liability cases. It is not the intent of this appeal to overturn Idaho's use of the
tripartite system; it is, however, the intent of this appeal to not only overturn the District Court's
Judgment, but also for this Court to issue a decision that an individual visiting a family member,
friend, or other loved one in the hospital is to be considered an invitee.
From a policy standpoint, a hospital should provide the utmost safety to its patients and
visitors, as that is the place people go when they are hurt, and those persons expect to not be further
hurt while either entering or exiting the hospital. If, for instance, Victor and Carol were walking
into the hospital together for Carol's admission when Victor fell, under EIRMC's logic, Victor
would not be an invitee. However, if it were Carol who fell, because she was already experiencing
chest pain, she would be considered an invitee. The same quandary would apply if, when Carol
was leaving the hospital after being discharged, and she slipped and fell on ice, EIRMC would
argue that she is a licensee because she was not bestowing an economic benefit on EIRMC.
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It is a disservice to the general public in the state of Idaho to have such a fluid and narrow

determination of the duty they are owed based solely upon the economic benefit the hospital is
receiving. Victor respectfully requests this Court determine that he, and all other plaintiffs in his
position, are considered invitees when visiting a hospital.

2. The District Court Erred in Granting EIRMC'S Motion for Summary Judgment.

In granting summary judgment to EIRMC, the District Court erred by, A.) improperly
weighing the facts and making improper credibility assessments, and, B.) failing to consider Bud
York's opinions.
A. The District Court Improperly Weighed the Facts and Made Improper Credibility
Assessments.

In granting summary judgment to EIRMC, the District Court improperly weighed the facts
and made improper credibility assessments.
Summary judgment is rarely proper in negligence cases. See Christensen v. Georgia-Pac.
Corp., 279 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Summary judgment is rarely granted in negligence

cases because the issue of whether the defendant acted reasonably is ordinarily a question for the
trier of fact.").
The District Court erred in granting summary judgment to EIRMC because genuine issues
of material fact existed. The very first page of the Order sets forth a genuine issue of material fact
which should have precluded the entry of summary judgment: "Dupuis slipped in the parking lot
on what he alleges to have been black ice and broke his hip." (R. Vol. V, p. 415) (emphasis

added). The record on summary judgment does not resolve whether or not there was black ice
present, thus, the District Court improperly weighed the facts and Victor's credibility as it pertains
to the "alleged" black ice.
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Nor does the record resolve whether or not ice melt was present in the location where
Victor fell. When asked if he observed any ice melt in the parking lot upon leaving the hospital,
Gordon testified "No, I did not. Like, no chemical or salt with which to melt the ice. Not even
sand." (R. Vol. II, p. 232 (p. 44: L. 9-11 )). The application of ice melt on the parking lot presents
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not EIRMC breached its duty of care to Victor.
Likewise, the District Court's ruling that EIRMC did not breach its duty to Victor as a
licensee, because Victor's "knowledge of the condition of the parking lot was at least equal to the
knowledge of EIRMC" (R. Vol. V, p. 421) constitutes an improper weighing of facts and
assessment of credibility. Evidence was presented in summary judgment (and is argued in detail
in Section 4, herein) that because the parking lot conditions changed, Victor did not have
knowledge of the dangerous condition, and further, that EIRMC had superior knowledge of the
dangerous condition based upon prior reported accidents similar to Victor's slip and fall.
When duty depends on disputed facts, it is a question of fact for the jury-not a question of
law for the Court. Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Property Owners' Association, Inc., 162
Idaho 317,322,396 P.3d 1199, 1204 (2017) ("[W]hether a duty existed becomes a question of fact
if it requires resolution of disputed facts."); Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. # 25, 149 Idaho 679,
686, 239 P.3d 784, 791 (2010) ("Normally, the foreseeability of a risk of harm, and thus whether
a duty consequently attaches, is a question of fact reserved for the jury.").
The duty EIRMC owed to Victor depends on disputed facts, and, in accordance with

Forbush, a jury should determine those disputed facts. As such, the District Court erred in granting
summary judgment to EIRMC.
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B. The District Court Erred by Failing to Consider the Opinions of Roland York.

In ruling on EIRMC's motion for summary judgment, the District Court did not consider
Roland York's Expert Report filed in opposition to EIRMC's Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
Vol. II, pp. 265-267) or the Declaration of Roland York filed in opposition to EIRMC's Motion to
Strike (R. Vol. IV, pp. 405-413).
When considering evidence submitted in connection with a motion for summary judgment,
a court can only consider material which would be admissible at trial. Gem State Ins. Co. v.
Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 175 P.3d 172 (2007). As a result, the court must determine objections to

the admissibility of evidence as a "threshold question" before addressing the merits of motions for
summary judgment. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 6,205 P.3d 650,655 (2009). If the
admissibility of evidence is raised by objection by one of the parties, the court must first make a
threshold determination as to the admissibility of the evidence before reaching the merits of the
summary judgment motion. Gem State Ins. Co., 145 Idaho at 14, 175 P.3d at 176 (citing Bromley
v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 811, 979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999).

The District Court erred in its failure to consider Mr. York's opinions before reaching a
decision on the merits of EIRMC' s motion for summary judgment. Mr. York's opinions provide
genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment from being entered, and
include:
"EIRMC is not only responsible, but negligent for not having, and/or enforcing,
deicing procedures. Therefore leaving parking lot in an unsafe condition due to
budget reasons." (R. Vol. II, p. 266).
"B&K did what they were required to do since their [sic] is no deicing policy.

EIRMC should have checked for ice and took action as soon as the snow plowing
was completed." (R. Vol. II, p. 266).
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"The deicer used that day on the snow long said 3000lbs was used on EIRMC
sometime that day. At the appropriate rate it should have been doubled or tripled
depending on what brand deicer was used." (R. Vol. II, pp. 266-267).

Mr. York's opinions also provide evidence in support of a common law negligence duty
being assigned to EIRMC, as argued in more detail in Section 3, below. The District Court erred
by failing to consider Mr. York's opinions.
Based on the forgoing argument made in this Section 2, the District Court erred in granting
EIRMC' s motion for summary judgment.

3. The District Court Erred in Determining EIRMC Did Not Assume a Duty of Care.
At all stages pertinent hereto, the District Court failed to adequately consider Victor's
common law negligence claim. At the hearing on February 14, 2020, it was clear the District Court
had made up its mind that common law negligence does not apply to this case because when
EIRMC' s attorney began arguing the issue, the District Court cut him off saying:
Yeah, I don't - I don't think you need to argue that. I'll let Ms. McCarthy respond.
But, I mean, the duty in this case arises from premises ownership. It's a premises
liability case. That's the only way the duty arises. So I'm onboard with that. You
can move on."
(Tr., p. 15, L.L. 11-15).
The District Court's Order mirrors the comments made at the hearing; in the Order, the
District Court rules:
It is the Court's opinion that liability in this matter is based upon the doctrine of
premises liability. Plaintiff has argued for common law negligence as well as an
assumed duty. However, there is no general duty to act to assist or protect
someone else. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 987 P.2d
309 (1999).
(R. Vol. V, p. 416).
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The District Court appears to have based its analysis and applicability of common law
negligence in this case solely on its limited interpretation from the Coghlan case that 'no general
duty to act to assist or protect someone else'. This is a very broad generalization of not only the

Coghlan case, but also common law negligence laws in the state of Idaho.
The actual language of this Court's ruling in Coghlan (which was woefully summarized
by the District Court) was:
There is ordinarily no affirmative duty to act to assist or protect another absent
unusual circumstances, which justify imposing such an affirmative
responsibility. An affirmative duty to aid or protect arises only when a special
relationship exists between the parties. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §
314A (1965).

Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999).
It appears the District Court took this ruling of the Court and determined it to be a blanket

ruling for common law negligence and ended its analysis there. The District Court replaces its
above cited synopsis of common law negligence law with the well-known and well cited general
principal that"[ e]very person, in the conduct of his business, has a duty to exercise ordinary care
to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others." Gagnon v. W Bldg. Maint., Inc.,
155 Idaho 112, 115, 306 P.3d 197, 200 (2013).
Additionally, the portion of Coghlan relied upon by the District Court related strictly to the
requirement of special relationships to create an affirmative duty. There have been no allegations
that a special relationship existed between Victor and EIRMC, thus, reliance and interpretation of
that limited portion of Coghlan is misplaced.
Further, this Court has since expanded upon Coghlan in its 2013 ruling that "Idaho law
recognizes two circumstances in which a person has an affirmative duty of care to another; a
special relationship or an assumed duty based on an undertaking." Beers v. Corp. of the President

of the Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 155 Idaho 680,686,316 P.3d 92, 98 (2013).
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As argued in the following, A.) EIRMC assumed a duty of care, and thus, B.) Victor has
established a cause of action for negligence that should have survived summary judgment.
A. EIRMC Assumed a Duty of Care.
The District Court provided minimal findings supporting its decision that EIRMC did not
assume a duty despite evidence presented to the contrary at summary judgment. But for the District
Court's citation to Baccus, the entirety of its analysis and decision relating to the assumption of
duty is:
Similarly, this is not a case where EIRMC assumed a duty. EIRMC had existing
duties owed to invitees and licensees and assumed no particular duty to
Dupuis .... As a landowner, EIRMC owed a duty to Dupuis only because Dupuis
was on EIRMC's property. Dupuis' arguments regarding common law duties and
assumed duties are inapposite.
(R. Vol., V, p. 417).
The District Court does not analyze nor address any of the evidence presented that EIRMC
had assumed a duty not just to Victor, but to all visitors ofEIRMC. As argued below, i.) EIRMC
assumed a duty based upon its undertaking, ii.) EIRMC assumed a duty by entering into the
Agreement with B&K, and iii.) the 'Balancing of Harm' analysis establishes a duty owed by
EIRMC.
i.

EIRMC Assumed a Duty Based upon its Undertaking.

With regard to the assumption of a duty based upon an undertaking, this Court has ruled,
"If one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior duty to do so,
the duty arises to perform the act in a non-negligent manner." Coghlan v. Beta
Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388,400, 982 P.2d 300, 312 (1999). That duty,
however, "is limited to the duty actually assumed." Beers v. Corp. of Pres. of
Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 155 Idaho 680,688,316 P.3d 92,

100 (2013) (citation omitted). "[M]erely because a party acts once does not
mean that party is forever duty-bound to act in a similar fashion." Id. This duty
arises "when [il one previously has undertaken to perform a primarily
safety-related service; [ii] others are relying on the continued performance
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of the service; and [iii] it is reasonably foreseeable that legally-recognized
harm could result from failure to perform the undertaking."
Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners' Ass 'n, 162 Idaho 317,326,396 P.3d 1199, 1208
(2017) (emphasis added).

As to the three elements set forth above in Forbush to determine when a duty arises, first,
EIRMC has undertaken a duty to perform a safety-related service by having an employee from the
Plant Operations Department walk the EIRMC premises to check for snow and ice issues in
EIRMC' s parking lots and on its sidewalks. As testified by Brett Hanson, the Director of Plant
Operations at EIRMC, someone should have gone out and checked the conditions of the parking
lot the evening of January 24, 2017. However, neither a facility safety officer nor someone from
plant operations did so. EIRMC's protocol that someone from plant operations is supposed to
check the parking lot for snow and ice related issues constitutes a safety related undertaking by
EIRMC.
As to the second element set forth above in Forbush, Victor, as well as the general public,
relied on EIRMC's continued performance in monitoring the parking lots and sidewalks to ensure
safety. And lastly, as to the third element, it is reasonably foreseeable that harm could result if
EIRMC ceased its performance of monitoring the parking lots and sidewalks; this is evidenced by
the many cases of persons slipping on ice at the EIRMC premises in the month preceding Victor's
fall on January 24, 2017.
EIRMC additionally undertook a duty to perform a safety-related service by contacting
B&K, after B&K had already left the EIRMC premises for the day, if any snow or ice melt related

issues arose. Because B&K was not present at the EIRMC premises 24/7, it could not continually
monitor the parking lots and sidewalks and re-apply ice melt as needed. As testified by Brent
Martin, B&K has experienced callbacks from EIRMC regarding reapplication of ice melt, which
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suggested to Mr. Martin that EIRMC was monitoring the parking lots. (R. Vol. II, p. 243 (p. 64:
L. 7-10)). Thus, the burden was on EIRMC to inspect the parking lots and sidewalks throughout
the evening and contact B&K if any additional snow or ice melt related services were needed. The
act of an EIRMC employee inspecting the parking lot and sidewalks and then calling B&K to come
back to the EIRMC premises to provide additional snow or ice melt related services, constitutes a
safety related undertaking by EIRMC.

ii.

EIRMC Assumed a Duty By Entering into the Agreement.

As argued during summary judgment, a tort duty to a third party was created when EIRMC
and B&K entered into the Agreement on October 30, 2013. In Baccus v. AmeriPride Servs., 145
Idaho 346, 352, 179 P.3d 309, 315 (2008), this Court addressed the issue of a contractual duty
supporting a claim arising in tort. In that case, an employer contracted with the defendant,
AmeriPride, to place safety mats on the property in locations designated by the employer. An
employee slipped and fell at a place where AmeriPride was supposed to have placed a mat but did
not. The plaintiff sued AmeriPride, alleging, inter alia, that AmeriPride was negligent because it
did not do what it was obligated to do under the contract.
As noted, "[ c]ontract obligations are imposed because of conduct of the parties
manifesting consent, and are owed only to the specific individuals named in the
contract." Just's, 99 Idaho at 468, 583 P.2d at 1003. AmeriPride has not alleged
that plaintiff was named in the contract. Plaintiff should not be left without a
remedy simply because AmeriPride had duties under a contract to which plaintiff
was not a party. The fact of the matter is that AmeriPride was under a legal duty to
prevent foreseeable harm once it promised to place mats at the southern entry, and
AmeriPride cannot immunize itself from this duty by entering into a contract with
someone else. AmeriPride's duty of care, if any, arose not by virtue of the fact that
it had contractual duty to Bechtel; rather, the contract was merely the means by
which AmeriPride assumed a legal duty of care to third persons.

Baccus v. Ameripride Servs., 145 Idaho 346, 352, 179 P.3d 309, 315 (2008) (emphasis added).
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EIRMC assumed the legal duty of care to third persons by entering into the Agreement
with B&K and undertaking the duty of notifying B&K if the EIRMC premises needed additional
snow or ice melt services. EIRMC was well aware that B&K had no responsibility to monitor the
EIRMC premises once the ice melt was applied, thus, EIRMC had the duty to monitor the surfaces
and to contact B&K should additional services be needed as provided for in the Agreement. There
was no other contractor monitoring the EIRMC premises after B&K left, and B&K was not
required to continuously monitor the premises, thus, it was solely EIRMC's duty to monitor the
premises and notify B&K of any issues.
Where a defendant has a duty independent of a contractual duty, such as in the
present case where the defendant has affirmatively assumed a duty, it matters not
whether the duty is breached through misfeasance or nonfeasance. The
longstanding definition of negligence in Idaho is "the failure to do something which
a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something a reasonably
careful person would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the
evidence .... " IDJI 2.20. In the present case, therefore, since AmeriPride assumed
the duty of placing mats at Bechtel for what was clearly a safety purpose and since
the risk of harm to third parties was reasonably foreseeable, it is immaterial whether
AmeriPride negligently performed its duties in an affirmative way or whether it
simply failed to perform its duties. Its conduct would amount to negligence in either
event.
Baccus v. Ameripride Servs., 145 Idaho 346, 352, 179 P.3d 309, 315 (2008)

EIRMC had a legal duty of care independent of its duties owed under the Agreement and
it acted negligently by failing to walk the EIRMC premises the evening of January 24, 2017. B&K
was under no duty to monitor the premises, EIRMC did not contract with another party to monitor
the premises, thus, EIRMC assumed the legal duty of care to monitor the premises, which it failed
to do.
iii.

The Balancing of Harm Analysis Establishes a Duty Owed by EIRMC.

A duty owed by EIRMC is established through the balancing of harm analysis used
previously by this Court. This Court has used the balancing of harm analysis "in those rare
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situations where we are called upon to extend a duty beyond the scope previously imposed, or
when a duty has not previously been recognized." Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846, 908 P.2d 143,
148 (1996). Victor's case is one of those rare situations where the balancing of harm analysis
should be used. As explained by this Court in Rife, the use of the balancing of harm analysis to
determine if a duty will arise in a particular situation involves policy consideration and the
weighing of several factors, including:
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the
policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the
risk involved (citations omitted).

Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846, 908 P.2d 143, 148 (1995).
As applied to this case, a duty should arise on behalf of EIRMC for both policy
consideration reasons and based on the factors listed above. The policy consideration is that by not
assigning a duty to defendants such as EIRMC, such defendants are allowed to escape liability for
injuries caused on their premises by limiting a plaintiffs recovery solely to the doctrine of
premises liability. And, as discussed in more detail in Section 1, above, Idaho's tripartite system
of premises liability does not guarantee that a hospital visitor is an invitee and entitled to a higher
duty of care. As to the factors set forth in Rife to be weighed,
1.) Foreseeability and Degree of Certainty. Victor's slip and fall on the ice in EIRMC's
parking lot was certainly foreseeable. As argued in the summary judgment briefing and
at the hearing, there were other reports of similar and recent accidents produced by
EIRMC in discovery (Tr. p. 23, L.L. 10-13) (R. Vol. II, p. 276). There is no argument
that this was a foreseeable accident.
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2.) Closeness of Connection Between Conduct and Injury. Victor slipped on ice that did
not have ice melt on it. Had EIRMC been monitoring the premises after B&K had left
for the day, it could have called B&K to return to the premises to apply more ice melt.
3.) Moral Blame to Defendant's Conduct. This may or may not factor into the analysis,
but from a policy consideration perspective, it would seem a visitor to a hospital would
expect the safest of parking lots as there are injured people walking into the entries of
the hospital for treatment. There should be a deterrent to EIRMC to cause further harm
to already injured visitors. Additionally, if a common law negligence duty is not applied
to EIRMC, EIRMC is able to shirk its responsibility to its patrons by arguing its visitors
are not invitees. Such dereliction of its responsibilities may make visitors not want to
visit their loved ones at the hospital.
4.) Policy of Preventing Future Harm. By assigning a duty under common law negligence
to EIRMC, it may help insure EIRMC and its employees take the duty of care seriously
by ensuring its parking lots and sidewalks are safe to all patrons, not just those
providing an economic benefit to EIRMC.
5.) Extent of Burden to Defendant and Consequences to the Community. There is no
burden on EIRMC to better monitor its premises for safety issues because EIRMC
already has the policies in place to do this; it just failed to do so on the evening of
January 24, 2017. There would be no consequence to the community because if
anything, the community would benefit by EIRMC having to keep its premises safe.
Based on the forgoing, in using the balancing of harm analysis, a duty of care under
common law negligence applies to EIRMC.
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B. Victor has Established a Cause of Action for Negligence That Should Have
Survived the Entry of Summary Judgment.

As argued throughout this Section 3, EIRMC has assumed a duty based upon an
undertaking, EIRMC assumed a duty by entering into the Agreement with B&K, and EIRMC
assumed a duty under the balancing of harm analysis, accordingly, Victor has established a cause
of action for common law negligence. In order to establish a cause of action for negligence, a
plaintiff must establish: "(l) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a
certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's
conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage." Gagnon v. W. Bldg. Maint., Inc.,
155 Idaho 112, 115, 306 P.3d 197, 200 (2013).
Victor has established that EIRMC owed a duty to all of its visitors to keep the parking lot
and sidewalks clear and traversable. EIRMC has breached that duty by failing to walk the grounds
the evening of January 24, 2017. EIRMC also breached the duty by eliminating the parking lot
pretreatment and decreasing amount of ice melt used to save costs for the hospital. Victor fell on
an area with no ice melt because of EIRMC' s breach, whether the fall was because of failure to
monitor the grounds or failure to use enough ice melt is an issue not before this Court. Lastly,
Victor suffered significant injuries and damages, resulting in Victor breaking his hip, subsequently
conducting sepsis, and requiring months of treatment and care. (R. Vol. I, p. 204). Based on the
forgoing, a cause of action for common law negligence applies in this case, and the District Court
erred in its ruling that this case was governed only by the doctrine of premises liability.
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4. The District Court Erred in Determining that, if Victor was a Licensee, EIRMC Did Not
Breach its Duty of Care Owed to Victor as a Licensee.
In its Order, the District Court determined Victor was a licensee and in analyzing the duty
owed to licensees, it ruled as a matter of law that:
Dupuis' knowledge of the condition of the parking lot was at least equal to the
knowledge of EIRMC. Dupuis had knowledge of the snowfall and knowledge of
the icy conditions a short time before the accident. Given these undisputed facts
and the weather conditions at the time Dupuis was on EIRMC' s premises, the Court
finds EIRMC did not breach the duty owed to Dupuis as a licensee.
(R. Vol. V, p. 421).
Based on the evidence produced at summary judgment, there is sufficient evidence to
support a finding that, if Victor is to be classified as a licensee, EIRMC breached the duty it owed
him.
The duty owed to a licensee is narrow. A landowner is only required to share with the
licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land. Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho
400, 401, 732 P.2d 369, 370 (Ct.App.1987); Ball v. City of Blaclifoot, 152 Idaho 673, 677, 273
P.3d 1266, 1270 (2012).
In its Order, the District Court ruled:
Based upon the duty owed to a licensee, Dupuis could only recover in this action if
the dangerous condition in the parking lot was unknown to Dupuis, and EIRMC
had a greater or superior knowledge of the condition.
(R. Vol. V, p. 420).
As argued below, there are genuine issues of material fact in the record evidencing, A.)
Victor did not know of the dangerous condition in the parking lot, and, B.) EIRMC did in fact have
a greater or superior knowledge of the condition.
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A. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist Which Evidence the Dangerous Condition
in the Parking Lot was Unknown to Victor.
As presented in summary judgment, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
or not the dangerous condition in the parking lot was known to Victor. The District Court ruled
" ... given the weather, the time of year, and the conditions as Dupuis walked into the building,
Dupuis had knowledge when exiting the building that the parking lot could be icy and pose a
danger." (R. Vol. V, p. 421).
The District Court appears to posit that because Victor was able to enter the hospital
without slipping and falling, he should have been able to leave the hospital two hours later without
slipping and falling. What the District Court failed to take into consideration when making this
assessment is:
■

Brent Martin of B&K left EIRMC around 6:00 pm or 6:30 pm the evening of
January 24, 2017 after finishing up his work. (R. Vol. I, p. 202).

■

When Victor and Gordon arrived at EIRMC around 6:30 pm on January 24,
2017, Gordon testified that the temperature was probably in the 40's, high 30's,
low 40's. (R. Vol. II, p. 229 (p. 26: L. 2-5)).

■

When Victor and Gordon left the hospital around 8:30 pm on January 24, 2017,
Gordon testified that "It was dark. It was a good deal colder, certainly in the
low 30's, possibly lower." (R. Vol. II, p. 229 (p. 29: L. 20-23)).

■

When walking back to the car around 8:30 pm, Victor and Gordon used the
same path that they had used to go from the car to the hospital earlier that
evening. (R. Vol. I, p. 199).

Based on the forgoing, when Victor and Gordon arrived at EIRMC at 6:30 pm the evening
of January 24, 2017, it was above freezing, and B&K had just finished its snow removal and ice
melt application services at EIRMC. However, when leaving two hours later, it was below freezing
and B&K had not been at EIRMC continually tending to the snow removal and ice melt needs.
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The parking lot was not in the same condition at 8:30 pm as it was when Victor traversed it two
hours prior; black ice had formed, and it was much darker, and colder outside.
Based on the forgoing, the District Court erred by ruling as a matter of law that Victor had
knowledge of the dangerous condition when the record contains evidence to the contrary which
establishes a genuine issue of fact.

B. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist Which Evidence EIRMC had a Greater or
Superior Knowledge of the Condition than Victor.

A genuine issue of material fact exists that EIRMC had a greater or superior knowledge of
the condition than Victor. As presented in opposition to EIRMC's motion for summary judgment,
at least three patrons had reported to EIRMC that slip and fall accidents had occurred due to ice
on the EIRMC premises. (R. Vol. II, p. 276). On January 3, 2017, an EIRMC patron slipped on an
invisible, sheer patch of ice on a walkway heading into the hospital; on January 4, 2017, an EIRMC
patron fell on the icy sidewalk in front of the lobby; and, on January 21, 2017, a patron slipped on
a lump of ice while leaving the building at the back entrance. (R. Vol. II, p. 276). There were three
incidents of patrons slipping and falling on ice in the 21 days immediately preceding Victor's slip
and fall on ice. Additionally, as argued in Section 3, above, EIRMC had knowledge that it needed
to have someone walking the premises to look for areas needing more ice-melt or snow removal
services, and based on those observations, it would call B&K to come back to EIRMC to provide
such services. EIRMC' s knowledge that parking lot conditions change throughout the day and
knowledge that additional ice melt may be needed, constitute a genuine issue of material fact
calling into question the District Court's ruling that EIRMC did not have a greater or superior
knowledge of the condition than Victor.
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Based on the forgoing, there is sufficient evidence in the record showing EIRMC breached
its duty owed to Victor as a licensee, thus summary judgment was not appropriate.

V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the forgoing, Victor respectfully asks this Court to reverse the District Court's
Memorandum Decision and Order and to reverse the District Court's Judgment with a remand for
the litigation to be adjudicated on the basis that Victor was an invitee at EIRMC at the time of the
subject loss.
DATED: August 6, 2020.
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